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HOST: As many of you know, tonight’s lecture in the Portland State College series is also the
first of another series. After learning of the resignation of President Cramer about a year ago,
the faculty of Portland State established the John Francis Cramer lecture as an expression of our
continuing respect for the man who led this college during the first three years of its official,
chartered, christened, degree-granting, storm-tossed, embattled, bursting-at-the-seams
existence.
I think it’s fair to say that this was an acute case of manifest destiny over which President
Cramer presided with firmness, tact, and great ability. It takes time for any event to become
established as a meaningful and important part of the life and tradition of a college. It’s our
hope that the John Francis Cramer lecture, as it is offered in each successive year, will become
such an event in the life of this college.
Tonight’s speaker, we are sure, will do much to invest this new series with the importance we
want it to have as a tribute to Dr. John Cramer, who was our president and remains on this
campus as one of our colleagues. Dr. George Hoffmann, professor of American History and
chairman of the Social Science Division, will introduce our guest and speaker.
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GEORGE HOFFMANN: Friends of Portland State College, it’s a pleasure indeed to introduce so
distinguished a historian as Dr. Henry Steele Commager, adjunct professor of History at
Columbia University and professor of American History and Civilization, American Studies at
Amherst College. Dr. Commager was born in Pittsburgh, received his Bachelor of Philosophy
degree from the University of Chicago, Master of Arts from the University of Chicago, and Ph.D.
from the University of Chicago. He also holds degrees from Oxford University and from
Cambridge University, as well as a number of honorary degrees. He has attended Copenhagen
University. He has talked at—in addition to his present position as adjunct professor of History
at Columbia and at Amherst—he started his academic career at New York University. There, he
became one of the youngest full professors. In academic language—it has a different
connotation than it may sometimes have to a layman—a full professor is one who has arrived
at the ultimate in terms of rank. It doesn’t have anything to do with his capacity for food or
drink or anything else.
[laughter]
HOFFMANN: I have to explain that. [laughs] Some of my… many not-so literal friends
sometimes wonder what I’m talking about when I speak of a full professor.
[laughter]
HOFFMANN: At any rate, Dr. Commager became professor of History at the New York
University, where he served until 1938 in that capacity, and then became professor of History
at Columbia University and continued there until 1956, when he went to Amherst. And he
continues, as I mentioned, as adjunct professor of History at Columbia. He also has held the
Harmsworth chair of American History at Oxford, as well as the Pitt chair of American History at
Cambridge. He is one of the very few, I believe, only American or any other nationality to ever
hold chairs at two English universities, Oxford and Cambridge.
I asked Dr. Commager… I read a long, long list of accomplishments and distinctions that simply
make a person such as myself about an inch high. I asked him, of all of these many honors and
distinctions… I didn’t feel, without a long discourse, that I could include them all. So I asked him
if there was anything he would like to have me say, and he said, “Yes, there was one thing,”
that he was a fellow at Peterhouse College and the only one, the only American, to hold that
distinction in its six hundred years of history. So I mention this in addition.
He holds, of course, membership in many, many societies; the American Historical Association,
the Massachusetts Historical Association, and many others. He has talked, in addition to those
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colleges and universities I’ve mentioned, he has talked at Brandeis University. He’s talked at the
University of Virginia and at Boston University. During World War II, he served with the LWI,
and in subsequent years to World War II, he also served as a state department lecturer in
German universities in 1954 and in Italian and Israeli universities in 1955.
He is the author of numerous books. We are especially well-acquainted with several of his
many books here at Portland State. We’ve used his very fine two-volume American history in
our History courses for many years. Documents of American History is another one of the books
we have used that Professor Commager has edited. In addition, we’ve used his very fine
anthology, the Civil War story: the Civil War told through those who fought in the war and
participated in the war, The Blue and the Gray. In addition to these, there are simply almost
dozens of books. I told one of my colleagues that I felt that I should introduce Dr. Commager as
a man who has written more books that I have read, and this is almost literally true. I
threatened this introduction, with some of my less knowledgeable colleagues, that I would
introduce him as having written more books than they’ve read. And I’m sure of this.
[laughter]
HOFFMANN: At any rate, it is, with a great deal of pleasure, that I introduce this occasion, the
occasion of the first John Francis Cramer lecture, Professor Henry Steele Commager, who will
speak to us tonight on the subject of the origins and nature of American nationalism.
Dr. Commager.
[applause]
HENRY STEELE COMMAGER: Professor Hoffmann, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. It
is a great distinction to give the first of the John Francis Cramer lectures, and indeed to be
associated with this young and flourishing institution of learning here in what is not so young
but is a very flourishing state. I believe you’re a hundred years old now, which gives you a
certain dignity even in the eyes of a representative from Massachusetts.
[laughter]
COMMAGER: And I want to discuss something that is, I think, of consuming interest not only to
Americans, but to people of all countries. People everywhere are concerned with the creation
of nations, and we are, at the moment, in the midst of the greatest era of nationalism in all
history. Twenty-eight new nations have emerged since 1945, and a half-dozen more are
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clamoring for emergence, are about to be born, in various parts of the globe. So that the
experience of the United States with nationalism, is, I think, an experience of immediate
concern and of far-reaching interest to the society generally.
There’ve been nations long before the American Revolution or the French Revolution. But the
rise of self-conscious nationalism, a cultural and linguistic and even an emotional nationalism,
as well as political, is very largely a product of the last two centuries. I have no intention of
entering into the vexatious and quite insoluble question of the origins of nationalism in the Old
World. Some historians trace that back to the Crusades, others to the 15th and 16th century.
The important thing is that the nationalism with which we are familiar is very largely a product
of the late 18th and the 19th centuries, and that this nationalism represented something new in
history. If not, indeed, something fundamentally different from the nationalism of the past.
Beginning with the French Revolution, older nations such as France herself or Denmark, for
example, or Norway […], experienced a new birth of nationalism. And all through the 19th
century, nations struggled towards birth of states and states disintegrated into nations as
people conscious of a common language and a common culture in history strove to transform
that cultural consciousness into political organization. Thus, with such peoples as the Greeks
and the Serbs and the early years of the century; thus with the many states of Latin America in
the early and middle years of the century; thus with Belgium in the ‘30s, or with Germany and
Italy and Bohemia and Finland in subsequent years; thus in the 20th century with the
emergence of the so many of the new states of Asia and of Africa. The whole thing culminating,
as I suggested, in this enormous outburst of national self-consciousness we have witnessed
since the Second World War.
Now, against the background of this emergent nationalism, or more recent nationalism, the
American experience of 1776 often appears to be a familiar and a normal historical experience.
And even American historians have customarily interpreted it as a harmonious part of the
history of modern nationalism. In one sense, this is proper enough. Of course, Americans
experienced those same compulsions, many of those same pressures, stimuli, that quickened
nationalism in the nations of the Old World, and the same forces of the economy; the Industrial
Revolution and railroads and things of that kind that operated in the Old World operated,
likewise, in the New.
Yet in a very real sense, the American experience differed, and differed fundamentally, from
the experience of Old World nations. In a very real sense, it can be said that the American
experience, far from being merely an extension of or a repetition of the history of European
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nationalism, reversed the history of European nationalism. Reversed in the processes of history
and introduced, therefore, something new into the realm of history.
This was the view of one of the most sagacious of American statesmen, namely John Adams. I
know no better or more dramatic way of introducing the subject than to quote two letters
written by men involved in the Revolution. First, the letter from that historian preacher,
Jeremiah Belknap, to his friend, Hazard, just after the Revolution was concluded. And the
second, a letter from John Adams to his friend, Hezekiah Niles, some thirty-five years later.
Writing to Hazard, Belknap said, “Comparisons sometimes illustrate subjects, but where can
one be found to illustrate this: imagine, my friend, thirteen independent clocks, going all
together by the force of their own weights and carrying thirteen independent hammers fitted
to strike one bell. If you can so nicely wind and adjust all these clocks as to make them move
exactly alike to strike at exactly the same instant, you’ll always have a curious and regular
beating of time. But ever so small of a deviation from the point of identity, who will be able to
know the hour by the sound of such an automaton?”
The plain English of this is that our present form of federal government appears to be
inadequate to the purpose for which it is instituted. John Adams couldn’t have seen this letter,
because it was a private letter and was not published until our time. Yet, in 1818, he wrote
almost precisely the same, using the same metaphor, to his friend Niles, but note with a
different conclusion. “The colonies,” he said, “had grown up under constitutions of government
so different, there was so great a variety of religions, they were composed of so many different
nations, their customs, manners, and habits had so little resemblance, their intercourse had
been so rare, and their knowledge of each other so imperfect, that to unite them in the same
principles in theory and the same system of action was a very difficult enterprise. The complete
accomplishment of it in so short of time and by simple means was perhaps the singular example
in the history of mankind. Thirteen clocks were made to strike as one. A perfection of a
mechanism which no artist had ever before effected.” Well, it was, and John Adams’ writing
after 1787 could use the same image and note that it was something new and unique in history.
But because thirteen American states hugging the Atlantic seaboard became a single nation
spanning the continent, and embracing now no less than fifty states, we take American
nationalism for granted. There was, however, nothing foreordained about it. And the real
question that every student of our history must ask themselves is why the United States did not
go the way of Latin America? Why the United States did not go the way of Europe? Why
nationalism did not fragment American territory as it fragmented the territory of most parts of
the globe, and, as it does to this day continues to fragment the Middle East, to fragment India,
to fragment other parts—Africa—and other parts of the globe.
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It’s well to remember that the most elementary foundations for the new nation still remained
to be laid. To many contemporaries, indeed, the forces that threatened the security of the new
nation appeared far more formidable than those that promised it prosperity. It would take me
far too far afield to cite you evidence or examples of this. Suffice, perhaps, to quote the French
statesman Turgot, who said that, in the General Union and the provinces among themselves, “I
do not see a coalition or a fusion making one body one and homogeneous. It’s only an
aggregation of parts, always too much separated, preserving always a tendency to division by
the diversity of their laws, their manners, their opinions, still more by the inequality of the
actual forces. It’s only a copy of the Dutch Republic. But after all, this republic has not to fear, as
American republic had, the enlargement of some of its provinces.”
The English economist Josiah Tucker said the same thing, that the American republic was bound
to fragment, bound to break up because of the force of the backcountry. “Their fate,” he said,
“seems to be a disunited people ‘til the end of time.” Even some Americans agreed with that.
Nathaniel Gorham, for example, of Massachusetts, in the Federal Convention said that we
didn’t need to worry too much about how big the lower house of Congress was. After all,
nobody, he said, would imagine the United States would still be in existence 150 years from
now on this scale, and so it would be unnecessary to worry about the increase in size.
That perverse and effervescent member of the Convention, Gouverneur Morris, the enfant
terrible of the Convention, some of you will remember some of his activities of one kind or
another. Among other things, he actually drafted the Constitution that we now have, and the
literary form of the Constitution owes more to him than to anybody else. He was a woodenlegged man, you know; he had lost one of his legs in an amorous escapade. He was a woodenlegged statesman who had the nerve to… the only man in all of history who had the nerve to
slap Washington on the back. He did it in a moment of enthusiasm when he had a bottle of
wine and he bet a bottle of wine that he would do it, and he did. And he wrote in his diary, “The
great man turned and looked at me, and I wished the earth had yawned and swallowed me up.”
[laughter]
COMMAGER: Said Morris, “Fond as the framers of our national Constitution were of the
republican government, they were not so much blinded by their attachment as not to discern
the difficulty or, perhaps, the impracticality of raising a durable edifice from crumbling
materials. History, the parent of political science, had told them that it was as vain to expect
permanently from democracy as it was to construct a palace on the surface of the sea.”
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But we don’t need to go to these melancholy predictions to bring home to us the elementary
truth that making thirteen clocks strike as one was, as Adams put it, a singular example in the
history of mankind. How much more remarkable to make forty-eight—and let us hope fifty, it’s
a little too early to know—let’s hope fifty clocks strike as one.
How did it happen? How did it happen that that people, which confessed the most
heterogenous of all racial stocks, the most varied soils and climates of any nation, the most
diverse and competing economic interests, the most variegated religious pattern, nevertheless
achieved a stable and enduring national character? Achieved it with a rapidity and achieved it
with an ease that confounded the expectations of friends and of critics alike?
In the Old World, with its age-old traditions of feudalism and dynastic nationalism, principle of
the particular triumphed over the principle of the general. But in the New World, the principle
of the general triumphed over the particular, and ours was the first major nation where the
general triumphed over the particular; where, as I say, the processes of fragmentation and
disintegration that almost everywhere in the globe had accompanied nationalism were arrested
and reversed, and gave way to consolidation and to unity.
One very important consideration is, of course, that the United States had developed almost
wholly in the era of the Industrial Revolution. I need not to point out the importance of such
things as transportation, for example, in welding the new nation together. But it’s appropriate
to remember that Latin America too developed in the era of the Industrial Revolution. It is
relevant to remember that in Europe, the Industrial Revolution appears to have accentuated
disintegration rather than to have mitigated it. It’s appropriate to keep in mind, for example,
that all the forces of geography, all the forces of economy and of industry and of everything
else, have been unable to bring Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland together in a single
nation to overcome the disintegrating forces of religion and of traditional enmities and
hostilities.
What, then, is the explanation of this phenomenon? This phenomenon of integration, of
consolidation, that is otherwise, I think, in the realm of the inexplicable?
Indeed, it’s so surprising, it seems that great many Americans have ascribed it very cheerfully to
Providence. Only the intervention of God could possibly explain the success of America in
becoming a single nation. I shan’t pause to give you examples of that. You can sum them up, in
all probability, from your own experience and your own thinking on the matter.
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In a very real sense, I think we can say that Lincoln’s observation was historically correct: the
fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation. The new nation was created. It was
almost a contrivance. It was a contrivance, a creative act of will on the part of soldiers and
statesmen and scholars and men of letters and scientists and artists and philosophers and men
of faith, who put their talents and their energies together to construct a national organization.
The United States started as a national state rather than as a nation. It started as a state and
was confronted with the task of vindicating that political and constitutional decision in all other
realms. Here again, the contrast with the Old World is very profound indeed, for in the Old
World, as you know, and in as well in the new nations of Asia and of Africa, nations start as
nations and become states. And in the United States, it is the other way around.
When the long traditions, for example, of English or French or Swedish or Danish nationalism
are compared with what Americans had in 1776 or ‘89, the contrast is clear enough. Even in
those states where political organization was fairly old, as in England or France, the nation grew
out of well-cultivated soil, out of centuries of cultural and historical integration. And for the
new nations of the 19th and 20th century, nations such as Norway or Belgium or Italy,
Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, or in our own day, the nations of the Arab world or of Israel.
We have a thousand years of history behind almost each of them, for almost all other nations
on the globe, the creation of political nationalism or political statehood is a culmination of
centuries and millennia of history, but for the United States, it was a starting point for the
creation of nationalism. We started with a political organization and filled in the nationalist
attributes and ingredients later on.
That filling in was to a very large degree of conscious and deliberate undertaking. We had to
furnish the new nation state with its ingredients of laws and language and literature, education
and history with heroes and myths and symbols, and song and story and ballad and all the other
ingredients that go into self-conscious nationalism. As Thomas Paine said, Paine who himself
who contributed so much to the making of the new nation, “A new era for politics is struck, a
new method of thinking hath arisen.” And this sense of newness has since delivered a
responsibility on the part of all those who are concerned that making the nation was so
widespread as to almost be universal in the generation of the Revolution. “Our style and
manner,” said Paine at another time, “our style and manner of thinking of undergoing a
revolution more extraordinary than the political revolution of the country. We see with other
eyes, we hear with other ears, we think with other thoughts than those we formerly used. We
can look back on our own prejudices as if they had been the prejudices of another people.”
Thus, the remarkable Noah Webster, who set out single-handed to create an American
language. He didn’t create one, he ended up by spelling labor and honor without the u, which
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was the original labor-saving device, I suppose, of the American people, but was scarcely a new
language. But Noah Webster was very conscious of the responsibility of creating a new culture.
“Unshackle your minds,” he exhorted his countrymen. “Unshackle your minds and act like
independent beings. You have an empire to raise in support of your exertions and a national
character to establish and extend by your wisdom and virtue. So turn everywhere we will. We
find the same self-conscious determination to create the ingredients of a nation.”
Young Alexander Hamilton, for example, not always enthusiastic for homegrown products,
nevertheless wrote his friend, Rufus King, “We are laboring hard to establish in this country
principles more and more national, and free from all foreign ingredients, so that we should be
neither Greeks nor Trojans, but truly Americans.” And all through Jefferson’s great corpus and
Jefferson’s writings runs the same theme, and we must turn deliberately away from the Old
World, create an American language and American letters and American law and American
politics and an American culture.
Improvement and the nationalization of cultural inheritance spread out even into fields where
it might be regarded as wholly irrelevant; into the fields of science, for example. Into the fields
of art and into the fields of music and into the fields of mathematics. Thus Nicholas Pike, who
wrote one of the most widely used textbooks on mathematics in the 18th century, wrote in a
new edition of 1788 as the United States, now an independent nation, it was judged that a
system might be calculated more suitable toward our meridian than any of those heretofore
published. It wasn’t as quite absurd as it sounds. He didn’t really propose a new mathematical
system as the legislature of Texas did some years ago when it resolved that since 3.1416 was
too difficult for pi, pi should hereafter equal 3.
[laughter]
COMMAGER: But, after all, Thomas Jefferson did, within a few years, introduce the decimal
system in currency, and if any of you have tried to do mathematics or arithmetic with pounds,
shillings, pence, and guineas, I suggest you try to keep your accounts in that form someday to
see the enormous advantage and indeed, I think, the real secret of American economic
supremacy is a substitution to the decimal system for a pound, shilling, pence system of English
coinage.
But in any event, this notion of independent nationalism spread, as I say, into realms such as
music or as art or as mathematics or as geography. Here is one Robert Davidson, otherwise
unjustly unknown to fame, who wrote a geography in verse. “We’ll now take our stand,” he
said, “on this happy and prolific and wide-spreading land, where nature is wrought with a far
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nobler hand. No more let the Old World be proud of her mountains, her rivers, her mines, her
lakes, and her fountains; though great in themselves, they no longer appear to be great when
compared with the great we have.”
Well, however it might fare in any event with mathematics and geography, one thing was clear,
and that was that the new nation must have its own philosophy. “Here, social man,” said Joel
Barlow, “a second birth shall find in a new range of reason. Lift his mind, feed his strong
intellect, a purer light, a nobler sense of duty and of right.”
Turn where you will, you find the same deliberate determination to start over in the cultural
realm.
How then did Americans go about? How did they achieve the extraordinary end of welding this
vast nation together so firmly that the Great Revolt of 1861 did not succeed, but failed; for we
must everlastingly ask ourselves a whole series of questions. Now, the first one I gave you
earlier: why didn’t we turn out to be like Latin America and have twenty nations or twentytwo? And another, why didn’t the Southern Confederacy succeed? Most secessions of that kind
do secede; witness the history of Europe in the 19th, or of Asia and Africa in the 20th century.
And the South had more ingredients of nationalism in 1861 than the United States had in 1776.
Also, I may say, though, that is a separate discussion, a separate lecture. The South held more
of the trump cards in the battlefield as well.
Well then, I cannot do more today than to suggest some of the more broader aspects of this
enterprise of nation-making. What is clear is that national unity for the whole, broad
continental area of the United States was not foreordained. The United States lacked many of
the essential ingredients of nationalism at the beginning. Just what those ingredients are is a
matter of dispute. Almost every historian, however, includes a territorial foundation, a political
organization, a language, and the history and traditions, and, in all probability, though there is
dispute about this, a common religion.
Now the United States had one or two of these. It had, after all, a language; and all the efforts
of Noah Webster and others to Americanize, it didn’t get very far. The experience of the United
States with language is a very interesting thing; it deserves a good deal more attention than we
customarily give it because we take it for granted, though we should not take the English
language for granted. It’s a remarkable thing that the American people were able to be
American, and yet use an inherited language and not feel under any inconvenience as a result
of the use of that language. It’s the English who feel the inconvenience nowadays rather than
the Americans. This, I suggest, if not unique, is most unusual. American English has departed far
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less from standard English of England than Canadian French has from Parisian French, or
Mexican Spanish from Madrid Spanish, or Brazilian Portuguese from Portugese of Madrid [sic],
or the East Indian Dutch from the Dutch of Amsterdam, and so it goes. We are almost the only
major colony that has retained the language intact. And, but, the great achievement here is not
so much retained in the language intact without the embarrassment or inconvenience to
ourselves. It was, rather, maintaining a uniform and standard language, and this was a very
great achievement that owes much to Noah Webster and to Webster’s readers and spellers and
dictionaries.
Need I remind you, perhaps I need because we take all these things for granted, that we do
have in this enormous territory a single and uniform language, and that it is practically
impossible for any ordinary person to know by speech what class any person belongs to or what
region he comes from. Compare that to the situation of almost any European country. There
are far greater differences in a little country like Denmark, in the speech of the Copenhagener
and the Jutlander. In a country like England, in the speech from London or from Surrey or from
Devonshire to Yorkshire or to Lancashire. In a country like Switzerland, where there’s four
different languages. There are far greater differences than there are in this enormous territory
of the United States, and with the possible exception of the speech of the Negro, it is
impossible, I think, to think to tell anything about a person’s class or economic affiliation by his
speech. Whereas in the Old World, as Orwell has said of the English, every Englishman is
branded on the tongue with his class. So, generally, in Europe, language and accent bespeak
social position, religious affiliation, as well as region.
The United States managed to overcome that, and quite deliberately managed to overcome it,
because the fathers of the American language, as it were, set themselves to creating a uniform
language, a uniform grammar, a uniform spelling; to wiping out social distinctions and wiping
out regional distinctions, and existing beyond the hopes and anticipations of contemporaries.
We did, then, have a language, though the fact that it is a common and uniform language and is
an element of union among us, is an American accomplishment rather than an accident of
history.
One of the second ingredients of nationalism: territory. We take territory for granted. You out
here in Oregon, surprisingly enough, take territorial unity for granted, though you shouldn’t
because Oregon was originally a part of the Hudson’s Bay Company domain or the Northwest
and Hudson’s Bay Company domain. And it’s really a surprising matter that it was attached to
the United States rather than to Britain or Canada. But the remarkable thing isn’t just that
Oregon stayed in the Union, but that the territory west of the Mississippi stayed in the Union,
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for if there was one principle upon which every statesman or philosopher was in agreement in
the 18th century and the early 19th, one universally accepted doctrine, it was that a republic
could not be large.
A military empire might possibly be large. A non-military empire could be medium-large, but a
republic had to be small. In part, they got that from the reading of Plato. In part, they got that
from the observation of the Swiss Republic or the Dutch Republic. In part from their experience
with England and with the colonies, but it was almost generally, almost universally accepted
that a republic could not be large.
How was the United States going to survive if it was a large country? As one citizen of
Pennsylvania wrote at the time of the Revolution, “There has been one path that can lead the
United States to destruction, and that is their extended territory. It would probably be to effect
this that Great Britain ceded us so much wasteland,” and that the notion that the West was
bound to be disintegrating was a notion deeply implanted not only in American psychology, but
in the conclusions of and the thinking of almost every European observer.
As Henry Adams, our greatest historian, said, looking at the United States of 1800, “No prudent
person then dared to act on the certainty that when settled, government could comprehend
the whole. And when the day of separation should arrive, and America should have her Prussia,
Austria, and Italy, as she already had her England, France, and Spain, what else could follow but
a return to the old […] condition of local jealousies, wars, and corruptions which had made a
slaughterhouse of Europe.”
Yet the result was precisely the opposite. Territorial growth more rapid and more extensive
than that of any other nation in modern history did not make for disunity, but for unity. Instead
of fragmenting the nation, it diffused, it strengthened the nation. Instead of contributing to
particularism, it diffused nationalism. This is a most remarkable achievement. It owes
something to the federal system which was the invention, as it were, of the fathers. It owes
something to that remarkable… to the remarkable insight of men like Hamilton and Jefferson
and Madison and Pinckney and others, who saw that there might be strength rather than
weakness in the diversity that would come with great size, so that particularism would cancel
each other out. Special interests, as it were, would cancel out.
In any event, Americans turned size into an asset instead of a debit. Almost everywhere in the
world, size is still a debit as far as nationalism is concerned. And as we look about us, we see
almost everywhere in the globe nations breaking up in and fragmenting into smaller units,
except where a military power is strong enough to prevent it, as in the case of Communist
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Russia and Communist China. Look at what’s happening in the Middle East. Look at what’s
happening in Africa as it’s splitting into one, little country after another. Many of them not
viable nationalities at all, like Ghana and the Congo and Nyasaland and various others. Look at
what at Latin America. Almost everywhere, size splintered up. But the United States turned it
into an element of strength and an element of unity.
That meant many consequences. And one of the consequences, particularly interesting though,
is that in America, love of country, patriotism, has almost always been a generalized, rather
than a localized, affair. Very few Americans have that passion and attachment to a particular
soil, or a particular region or county or town or village, that is so common in the Old World.
Americans do have, or did have, a regional literature, but rather a nostalgic regional literature.
Rather a tribute, I think, to the passing of regionalism to anything else. We have no literature
comparable, for example, to the English literature of country and village. To that loving study of
field and river and brook. To those curious two-volume history of cricket and lower puddle. Or
of trout fly, fly casting on the upper Tweed, or something of that kind that engages the energies
of retired colonels in England.
In America, they almost always think of their country as a whole. Boys and girls not only in the
prairie states, but in the Northwest and the Southwest can sing with rapture, “We love thy
rocks and rills and woods and templed hills,” though most of them wouldn’t know a wood and a
templed hill if they saw it.
[laughter]
COMMAGER: They take for granted that Plymouth Rock in New England belongs to them just as
surely as Texas and Arizona belong to them. The whole of American patriotic sentiment seems
to be a nationalized patriotic sentiment, and our most normal psalm is “America the Beautiful,”
which chants the praises, as you know, of spacious skies and purple mountains and prairie land
from sea to shining sea. And the most characteristic of American poets, Walt Whitman, sang
the song of the open road, “Healthy, free, the world before me, the long, brown path before
me, leading wherever I choose.”
We have so much […] Nathaniel Hawthorne to Longfellow in the 1830s, that we’d have no
country at all. Well, that’s something of an exaggeration, but many foreign observers came to
the same conclusion, that America was too large for any person to take in, and that American
patriotism was inevitably so generalized that it would be weakened. This was, in part, the
product of a pioneering experience, in that habit of using up land and moving on, that which is
the very essence of the westward movement in America. It is, in part, a product of large-scale
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immigration from the Old World; once immigrants had torn up their roots and transplanted
themselves, the subsequent transplanting were minor affairs and came relatively easy. The
pioneer learned to cherish whatever he had; to believe that it was the best place in the globe
until he moved on to some other place. To name it Eden or to name it New Babylon until he
had gutted it, and moved onto some new Eden or some new Babylon.
“Woodman, spare that tree, touch not a single bough; in youth it sheltered me, and I’ll protect
it now,” said the pioneer as he burned down the forest or cut them down and moved on to
bigger and better forests to burn down or cut down. This habit of movement made it very
difficult to get permanent attachments, and most of us think of those Americans who somehow
have stayed in backwaters like Massachusetts or Virginia or South Carolina and maintained
permanent attachments, as not really very American, as more English or more European than
American because of these curious devotions to locality. Well, mobility was both cause and
consequence of this general affection for the Old World, and that mobility need was to say a
constant in our history. The greatest period of the westward movement has been in the last
fifteen or twenty years, far greater than in the period before 1890, at which time Turner
announced the end of the frontier.
What should we say of the third of the ingredients of nationalism? A common body of history,
traditions, loyalties, affections, an historical past, with all that goes with the historical past, its
heroes, its villains, its friends and allies, its enemies and antipathies, its institutions and its
culture.
It’s scarcely necessary for me to remind you that for a century and a half, America had been a
part of the British Empire, and that such loyalties had existed. They’d been loyal to the mother
country. Such attachments had existed even to the royal family or to the mother country. There
was, as yet, no firm American feeling. There was feeling for Pennsylvania or Virginia or the
Carolinas, but not for America as a whole, though that was in the making somewhere in the
1770s and 1780s. It would be relatively easy to make out a case both for the absence of that
common sentiment and for the birth and development of that common sentiment, because in a
country as large as America, with its people as literate and as articulate, you could find
expressions on both sides. You could find, for example, a Lewis Morris, father of that
Gouverneur Morris, whom I quoted a little while earlier, providing in his will that his son,
Gouverneur, should never set foot in the neighboring colony of Connecticut lest he abide that
lowcunning, so incident to the people, of that country. But you can find on the other side
Patrick Henry saying, “I am no longer Virginian. We are no longer men of Massachusetts. Our
great title is Americans.”
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Be that as it may, this was an expression of wish and of hope rather than of reality, for there
was not of yet a common body of history or tradition or of loyalty or patriotism. There was not
yet a sense of common past because there was no common past. All of that was in the making.
And the rapidity and the success with which American set themselves to create a common past
is one of the most thrilling chapters in the whole modern, cultural history. Almost every
American generation was conscious of the responsibility of the necessity of creating a sense of
the past and a sense of common patriotism. Again, it would delay us far too long for me to cite
chapter and verse, for this is, indeed, the subject of a very special and elaborate analysis.
Suffice to say, turn in any direction you will, there was this awareness of the need for a
common past and a common body of traditions, and a determination to create it and to create
it with extraordinary rapidity. Note, for example, the rapidity with which Americans created
their heroes.
We were pretty lucky, in the beginning, in having some villains. We’ve had no luck since the
Revolution in having villains. We had George III and Benedict Arnold to get us started, and
we’ve been doing business on them ever since. They’re rather shopworn by now, and it's rather
a pity that we can’t get some new villains, but we haven’t had any major ones since the
Revolution, which shows how fortunate we are.
But we started out by great, good luck with heroes all made to order. No country was ever so
fortunate in its founding fathers than the United States, or in having a man like George
Washington as a father of its country, and one of the fascinating chapters of our cultural history
is the speed with which Washington became a national hero and a myth and a legend in his
own lifetime. As early as 1776, John Adams, who didn’t look kindly on anyone who wasn’t a
member of the Adams family, nevertheless wrote to his wife that every monarch in Europe
looked like a valet beside George Washington. “Washington,” he said, “was a demigod.” And
from that time on, the idea that Washington was an immortal caught on and increased, so that
in his own lifetime, he came to occupy something of a position that Alexander the Great did or
the Frederick Barbarossa did or that […] did or that Joan of Arc did for their countries. And the
speed, again, with which Americans achieved for themselves, the symbolical and mythological
equivalents of Remus and Romulus, or of Horsa and Hengist, or of the Norman conquerors or of
Joan of Arc, is a fascinating chapter in our history, though it is one, as I say, that I cannot pause
to elaborate upon.
Much of this early appeal to self-consciousness, this early conscious creation of a national past
and a national character, sounded a martial note. But that was a reaction into the War of
Independence. One of the most interesting things about American nationalism is the things we
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did without. You know, there is a famous paragraph in Henry James’ biography of Hawthorne,
in which Hawthorne takes a stand in 1840, and looks out on the America of 1840 and all the
things that weren’t there. He said, “It takes a great deal of history to make a little literature.”
And what did Hawthorne have? And then comes that paragraph which I cannot cite to you
exactly, in which he says, “No nation as yet… no country as yet, scarcely a national name. No
monarchy, no aristocracy, no church, no cathedrals, no abbeys, no Norman churches, no ivyclad parsonages, no great palaces, no castles, no thatch cottages, no great universities, no
Oxford, no Cambridge, no public schools, no Eton, no Harrow, no cathedrals, no bishops, no
politics, no art, no music, no museums, no literature, no novels, no sporting class, no...” Well,
and then he says himself as a lower case, “and, after all, we managed to write novels anyway.”
But the point is that we started without a great many things that European countries had as a
matter of course. Now, one of the things that we managed to create a nation without—and I’m
going to mention several things—we managed to create a nation without a military
establishment or a common enemy. That’s a very remarkable thing. If you pause to think of the
role of the common enemy in the creation of nations, you will realize how extraordinarily
difficult it is not to have one. You will realize that almost every nation that has come into
existence in the 19th and 20th century has found it essential to have an enemy. Think, what…
well, there wouldn’t be any Irish nationalism without England, without Cromwell.
[laughter]
COMMAGER: And think what Russia has been to Swedish nationalism. What Germany has been
to French nationalism. What Austria has been to Italian nationalism. What, today, Israel is to
Arab nationalism, and the Arab countries to Israeli nationalism. Or what, may I say—if you don’t
object to injecting a political note—but in our egregious folly, we are enabling China to do to
create a new Communist nationalism, with the United States as a feared and hated enemy by
our policies of non-recognition and non-intercourse. This is a very familiar and a very old and
well-established phenomenon in the history of nationalism.
The United States didn’t have a common enemy. To be sure, we had England, but it’s hard to
have England for a common enemy. We won the first war. We persuaded ourselves that we
won the second; the English never argued about it because they forgot that there was one. And
the English aren’t good at holding grudges anyway. So we had to shift from the common enemy
of England and find a new one, and there wasn’t any new one. Not until the mid-20th century
have we been able to conjure up again a common enemy.
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Now this meant that we had to get along without the image of the enemy, and we had to get
along, likewise, without those things that are partially a product of that image and partly a
creation of it, a creator of it, namely the military. We are one of the few nations who had
become a nation without the military establishment. Think of the role of the military in the
history of French nationalism, the history of German and Prussian nationalism. In Sweden and
Italy, everywhere you turn, the military has been one of the great instruments in the creating of
nationalism, and one of the great instruments in the spread of nationalism. But the United
States never had a military until our own day. We disbanded the army after the Revolution; the
total army, officers and men, was less than 1,000 when Washington took office. It was less than
16,000 at the outbreak of the Civil War. Not until the 20th century did we get a real military.
We never had a military class. There was never any real social prestige in Annapolis or West
Point, such as there was in Sandhurst or Dartmouth in England, for example. The military never
influenced nor dictated public affairs as they did abroad. The uniform was not, in the 18th and
19th century, influential in the creation of nationalism. Quite the contrary.
We managed, therefore, to become a nation without national antipathies, without a national
enemy, without the military establishment, which was a very extraordinary achievement, and
one that is hard to match, I think, in the history of any other nation.
I may add, just in passing, because time does not permit me to elaborate upon it, that we
managed to become a nation without another very important ingredient: the ingredient of
religion. I said at the beginning that scholars are of some difference of opinion about whether
religion is an essential ingredient or just a common one. But in any event, it is a common one. It
is hard to imagine, again, Irish nationalism without Catholicism. It is hard to imagine Italian
nationalism without religion or German nationalism without it. To this day, church and state are
one in almost every nation in the Old World, and think of the role of religion in the creation of
the Arab nations, or of Israel or of Pakistan or of other parts of the globe today. Religion has
been a crucial ingredient in the making of nationalism, and church and state have often been
two sides of the same coin.
The United States was the first Western country to disestablish the church, to set up a system
of separation of church and state, and it was the first Western country to permit absolute
equality in religious denominations and religious faiths. It was assumed, at the time, that that
would not only lead to moral depravity of the most dangerous character, but that it would be
disintegrating as far as the state was concerned, for the church was one of the props of the
state, and the state was one of the pillars of the church. But the United States got along
without a state church, and need I say that religion in America got along without state aid, and
got along very well; rather better, than in the old… most Old World countries.
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This was an American invention, as it were, the separation of church and state, and the notion
of independent churches, and America managed to create its own nationalism without a
religious basis, and we are the first of the countries, certainly of the Western world, that have
done so. Even today, most countries have a religious basis for nationalism. Even Communist
China and Communist Russia, it isn’t religion in our sense of the word, but they have made
Communism itself a religion and, therefore, a prop of the state. It is, I think, an extraordinary
tribute to American nationalism that was able to forego that particular affiliation.
Well, these crucial ingredients of nationalism, then—a firm territorial basis, a homogenous
population, history and traditions and loyalties, a military establishment, national antipathy, a
religious organization—all these were lacking. Yet we managed to create nationalism anyway.
And, in the process, we departed in two other respects from the European pattern, two
respects of very great interest. One is that American nationalism was, to a degree, a democratic
achievement. That it was an achievement in which… an achievement, really, of the people at
large. Again, unless you are familiar with the history of modern nationalism in other countries,
even as recently as our own day, the history of the making of Israel, the history of the making of
the Arab states, or Pakistan, you will not realize, I think, how to what an extraordinary degree
nationalism in most countries has been the creation either of a dynasty, an army, a religion, or
an intellectual elite. In the case of Israel, of an intellectual elite. In the case of Pakistan, the
same thing, an intellectual elite.
Ours is the first country where the creation of nationalism was a, as it were, a popular
undertaking, and a popular enterprise, where everybody participated and continued to
participate, because every new generation of immigrants continued to participate, because we
decided on a liberal immigration policy, something we have abandoned since 1924, I think, to
our loss. We were able to incorporate the newcomers from the Old World into the body politic
and the social body and the economic body and the cultural body and to make them, again,
elements of strength instead of elements of weakness, so that we turned heterogeneity into
strength instead of having it weaken and fragment the country as it might have otherwise done.
And that was because we accepted immigrants as equals just as we accepted Western territory
as equals. We take that for granted, but there is no reason why you should. The United States is
the first country in the world to get rid of colonies and turn them into states. Every other
country has kept its backcountry as colonies. The United States, by the ordinance of 1787,
decided that Ohio would be a state, not a colony. And that Iowa and Oregon and that all other
parts would be states, not colonies.
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Well, the American nationalist undertaking was a popular, a democratic undertaking. A
democratic enterprise. One to which people generally contributed, and there it differs again,
most sharply, from the national nation-making of most other nations.
Finally, in one other respect the American experiment differed, and differed very sharply from
the European, and that was in its relation to Romanticism. Everywhere in the Old World, the
emergence of nationalism was associated with Romanticism. From the literary point of view, as
those of you know who are students of literature, nationalism is merely a function of
Romanticism. The age of reason had been non-nationalist, it had been a cosmopolitan age. It
had been an age which tried to ignore national boundaries and national differences and create
a international society, cosmopolitan society; and very largely succeeded in doing so. It was
very difficult to develop genuine nationalism in the cosmopolitan age of the 18th century.
But Romanticism looked with approval upon nationalism, because it did associate itself not with
cosmopolitan things, but with everything that was local. It was parochial, it was traditional, it
was emotional, rather than with things that were general and that were rational. I need not
elaborate on anything as familiar as this, as familiar to students, that Romanticism concerned
itself with the past, with the golden age of the past, with chivalry, with the Middle Ages. It
cherished origins and traditions and myths and legends; the picturesque and the sentimental.
The medieval. It was like… you remember Robinson’s poem of “Miniver Cheevy who loved the
Medici, albeit he had never been one. He would’ve sinned incessantly if he had been one.” It
looked back and admired the Medici, and everything connected with them.
It addressed itself, therefore, to the recovery of the past. The recovery of folktales and folklore
and border ballads and the architecture of the past. It recreated Gothic architecture. It
recreated the folklore of the Middle Ages in the novels of a Hugo in France or the plays of a
Schiller in Germany or the novels of an Ingemann in Denmark or Wergeland in Norway or the
novels of a Scott in Scotland and the border country. It conjured up the past rather than the
past.
Romanticism, by its very nature, looked backward, and nationalism that was associated with
Romanticism, by its very nature, looked backward. But in the United States, and almost alone in
the United States of all nations, Romanticism did not look backwards because there wasn’t any
back to look to. In the United States, we had, as Hawthorne wrote in his preface to The Marble
Faun, “A country where there is no shadow, no antiquity, no mystery, no picturesque and
gloomy wrong, nor anything but a commonplace prosperity in broad and simple daylight.” And
he added the hope that it would be a long time before romance writers may find congenial and
easily handled themes in the annals of our stalwart republic.
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Well, Romanticism then, in the Old World, was reactionary. But the New World went in for
Romanticism, too, as all of you know; you have some examples of its architecture out here, all
of you who in school have to endure the bad poetry of Edgar Allan Poe, know what
Romanticism did to Mr. Poe and his poetry and some of his writings. Romanticism raged
through American culture, which then ravaged… ravaged it quite as it ravaged it in the Old
World.
But with this fundamental difference: that it couldn’t operate in the political realm. It couldn’t
force us to look to the past because we had no past as yet to look to, though we tried to create
one. It was in the 1840s, as late as that, that we discovered the pilgrim fathers, as you know.
‘Twas in the 1840s that we discovered Plymouth Rock and Bradford’s journal was published,
discovered and published for the first time. Hutchinson’s history was recovered and everyone
went around repeating Mrs. Hemans’ dreadful verses about the stern and rock-bound coast. As
you know, it’s neither stern nor rock-bound, it’s sandy, but she had never been over here and
didn’t know any better.
[laughter]
COMMAGER: And people who don’t think don’t know any better either, but in any event, we
tried to recover a past, but there wasn’t much to recover. And what did we do with our
customary ingenuity? We weren’t going to be deprived of the advantages of Romanticism, so
we substituted the future for the past, and American Romanticism looked forward instead of
backward. American Romanticism romanticized the West instead of the Old World.
Romanticized the prairies and the plains and the Rockies and the Pacific. Romanticized the
westward movement. Romanticized the future above all; as James Fenimore Cooper wrote in a
letter to a friend over in Greece, “The moral feeling with which a man of sentiment,”—a very
typical Romantic phrase—“a man of sentiment looks upon the plains of your hemisphere is
connected with recollections.” Here it is mingled with his hopes that the same efforts of the
mind is equal to the one as to the other.
But a speculator on the moral things can enjoy a satisfaction here that he who wandered over
the plains of Greece will seek in vain. The pleasure of the latter is unavoidably continued with
the melancholy regrets while here, all that reason allows will be hoped on behalf of man.
[program ends]
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